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SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY

Section 1 of the Sherman Act' outlaws "[e]very contract,
combination inthe form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ....
" The
legality under this provision of a form of group economic action
called a "boycott" or, less invidiously, a "concerted refusal to
deal" '2 has frequently been tested in the courts.' In its simplest
aspects, a boycott or concerted refusal to deal is nothing more than
an agreement among a number of economic actors to sever or limit
economic relations with another economic actor or actors. Where
the only object of the concerted refusal to deal is higher profits for
the members of the combination, the courts have consistently
condemned the combinations as section 1 violations.4 One reading
of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,"' which has found
1.15 U.S.C. § 1(1964).
2. The term "boycott" will be used interchangeably with "concerted refusal to deal"
without any intent to attach a pejorative connotation to the former.
3. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild
of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,
282 U.S. 30 (1930). See generally H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, ANTITRUST LAw 439-56 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild
of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
5. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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some support among the commentators," finds in that case a rule
that all boycotts are illegal per se. The soundness of this reading is
7
discussed below.
A group can agree to deal on certain terms with, or cut off
completely, another person or business in order to achieve a wide
variety of objectives. The purpose of the group's action could be
nothing more praiseworthy than the elimination of a troublesome
competitor in order to increase the group's profits. A group of
businessmen or consumers formed to work for equal employment
opportunities for disadvantaged minorities could agree to boycott a
business establishment which the group felt engaged in
discriminatory hiring practices. Used car dealers in a certain area
might form a trade association, mutually agreeing to refrain from
deceptive advertising practices or "high pressure" sales techniques.
Violations of the agreement might be sanctioned by the revocation
of the association's "Fair Dealer" seal and expulsion from the
association." There seems to be no limit to the range of public
purposes-as opposed to narrow economic self-interest-which a
group might attempt to promote through the use of their collective
economic power in a boycott.9
It is analytically useful to classify the kinds of purposes which
can motivate a concerted refusal to deal in terms of the degree of
material benefit the group will obtain from the realization of their
objective." A group's purpose will be considered commercial if the
objective is profit, and the group is composed entirely of
businessmen. A group's purpose is economic if the objective is the
advancement of the group's economic self-interest and is not a
commercial purpose as defined above. A group's purpose is
noneconomic if it has "no substantial content of material selfinterest."" Accordingly, a labor union's strike for higher wages
would have an economic, but noncommercial purpose. A boycott of
stores which do not employ a certain number of Negroes would have
an economic purpose only if the boycotting group were composed
6. See Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 COLUM. L. REv.
843, 862 (1959); 57 MICH. L. REv. 1244 (1959).
7. See notes 120-61 infra and accompanying text.
8. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
383 (1967).
9. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.

705, 708 (1962).
10. This framework is derived from Professor Coons's presentation. Id.at 712-13.
11. Id.at 713.
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of Negroes or people likely to benefit materially from an increase
in Negro employment. The term "noncommercial purpose,"
therefore, includes purposes both economic and noneconomic.
The focus of this article is the interaction between the policies of
the Sherman Act and noncommercial concerted refusals to deal. The
question is to what extent the Sherman Act does or should impose
restraints on private attempts to pool economic power to further
noncommercial goals by inflicting economic harm on others. If
restraints on the aggregation of private economic power are found
to be required by the policies of the Sherman Act, the inquiry will
then turn to what constitutes an appropriate judicial response to the
problem of defining and limiting those restraints.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND ISSUES

Problems in Defining the Necessary Agreement in Noncommercial
Boycott Situations
A concerted refusal to deal can be illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act only if two threshold requirements are met: there must
be (1) some effect on "trade or commerce among the several
States,"'" and (2) sufficient agreement to constitute a "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy."'1 3 For purposes of the present
analysis it is assumed that the concerted refusal to deal sufficiently
affects interstate commerce to provide a basis for federal jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause. 4 The problems involved in finding the
necessary agreement in noncommercial boycott situations deserve
further discussion, however.
The question of when a conspiracy or agreement can legitimately
be inferred solely from parallel action of competitors has long
troubled courts enforcing the Sherman Act. 5 Parallel action by
competitors might be explainable as no more than the aggregate of
independent responses to identical market considerations. But
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1964).
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The effects on interstate commerce necessary to establish
federal power to regulate under the Commerce Clause are quite easy to meet in practice. See,
e.g., Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (allegations that

white real estate brokers' conspiracy to prevent Negroes from owning or renting property in
white neighborhoods had impeded the flow of interstate commerce of persons, mortgage
financing, and building materials held sufficient).

15. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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parallel action could also be a manifestation of the actors'
agreement on a common course of conduct. Proving agreement from
such parallel action in boycott situations is especially difficult
because a group of competitors may stop dealing with someone for
as many reasons as there are group members. The test adopted by
the courts, according to one commentator, is whether "the decisions
of the alleged conspirators were interdependent, that [is] the
decisions were consistent with the individual self-interest of those
concerned only if they all decided the same way."'" If the decisions
are not interdependent, that is, if each actor could explain his
decision in terms of factors valid regardless of the actions of other
members of the alleged group, then under the rule of Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.17 it is not
proper to infer an agreement from the bare fact of parallel action.
Under the Theatre Enterprises test of interdependence of
decision, finding the requisite agreement in noncommercial conicerted
refusals to deal may be difficult. In a noneconomic boycott, where
the parties by definition are acting without any purpose to advance
their own "material self-interest,"'' 8 the decision of each party to
boycott is not an economic decision and, arguably, would not
depend on the other parties' reaching a similar decision. This
argument, however, fails to recognize that a potential boycotter may
be unwilling to suffer the consequences of a boycott in which he is
the sole actor. Thus, his decision to refuse to deal with a certain
company might well be an interdependent decision. But, where the
danger to the decisionmaker who boycotts alone is insignificant-for
example, the danger to a consumer from an abortive consumer
boycott of a nonessential commodity-the degree of interdependence
can become miniscule. It may -be more difficult, therefore, to show
interdependence in a noncommercial boycott, than to show
interdependence where the person is avowedly acting for a
commercial purpose, but it is by no means impossible.
Where no explicit agreement can be found, it is appropriate to
define the essentials of a section 1 "agreement" in terms of the
16. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 658 (1962).
17. 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (parallel refusal by defendants to license first-run film exhibitions
in plaintiff's theatre held insufficient to require the directing of a verdict in plaintiff's favor

in light of evidence suggesting valid business reasons for each to refuse to deal individually).
18. See Coons, supra note 9, at 712-13.
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distinction between interdependent and independent decisions. If the
decisions had in fact been independent, then presumably the same
decision would have been reached by each actor, regardless of the
others' conclusions. Finding an agreement and imposing liability
because of the fortuity of the simultaneous occurrence of a number
of individual and otherwise lawful refusals to deal would seem an
interference with an individual's freedom of trade neither warranted
by the wording of the statute nor justified by its policies. 9
Concerted Refusals to Deal: Definitions and Categories

The term "concerted refusal to deal" can thus be applied to a
great many differing patterns of economic interaction among
individuals and groups. It will facilitate analysis to break down the
broad category of concerted refusals to deal into the three most
frequently observed types of boycotts, drawing distinctions based on
the differing relationships between the group and the victim. A
primary concerted refusal to deal is a trade pattern in which a
number of economic actors at one level of the productive or
distributive process discontinue economic relations with an actor or
actors at another level, or are willing to continue relations only on
certain terms. 2 A boycott of a certain product, such as grapes, by
consumers would be an example of a primary boycott, as would the
concerted refusal of retailers to sell certain products to the public.
The distinguishing feature of a primary boycott is that the only
direct economic harm js suffered by businesses which are not
competing with the members of the combination. In a secondary
boycott, the group threatens to boycott economic actors at another
level to force them in turn to refuse to deal with someone
else-usually a competitor of the boycotting group.2' An agreement
among retailers to refuse to buy from wholesalers who sell to certain
other retailers would be a secondary boycott.22 A third variety of
concerted refusals to deal may arise when a group establishes a joint
facility, such as a product-testing or research laboratory, or a trade
19. Cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954).
20. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930), first held that
a group's refusal to deal except on certain terms could constitute an unlawful concerted refusal
to deal.
21. See Note, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the Sherman
Act, 30 U. CH L. REV. 171, 178 (1962).

22. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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association.13 Limitations on access to this joint facility could
constitute a concerted refusal to deal.
Since a concerted refusal to deal can be effective only against
those who would otherwise have dealings with the combination, a
primary boycott could not be used by a group to force any of their
competitors out of business or to compel acquiescence in the group's
demands concerning trade practices. 24 To eliminate competitors or
force them to discontinue offending competitive practices, the group
must use either a secondary boycott or restrictions on the

competitor's access to a group facility. In a secondary boycott, there
is a harm not found in other kinds of concerted refusals to deal: the

extension of a group's economic power through the conscription of
neutrals, involving them and their economic power in the dispute,
and forcing them to choose between losing the group's business or

losing the victim's business.
These various kinds of refusals to deal are not mutually

exclusive; they can and do occur in assorted combinations

2:"

The

definitions are set out at this point because the terms keep recurring

in the reported boycott cases, and because it is believed that their
use will make easier the task of describing the harms, benefits,
available alternatives, and appropriate judicial responses in

noncommercial refusal to deal situations.
POTENTIAL HARMS FROM CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL

Economic Harms in Concerted Refusal to Deal Situations,
Regardless of Purpose

The obvious economic harm in a concerted refusal to deal is the
injury to the victim,

6

the severity of the harm depending upon the

23. See 30 U. CHI. L. REV., supra note 21, at 180 & nA9.
24. Id. at 178 & n.36.
25. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light& Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961),

where the complaint alleged that a trade association composed of utility companies, gas
distributors, and gas appliance manufacturers had refused to approve plaintiff's gas burner
and that the utilities thereafter refused to supply gas for use in plaintiff's burner. The
complaint was held sufficient to state a cause of action under section I of the Sherman Act.
In Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967), the complaint
alleged (I) that defendant real estate brokers' association refused to admit Negro realtors to
membership (denial of access to a group facility) and (2) that members of the association had
agreed not to sell or rent homes in white neighborhoods to Negroes (partial baycott of
prospective Negro purchasers or lessees of such homes).
26. A businessman can be driven out of business by an effective primary boycott aimed at
supply or demand, due to his inability either to buy needed supplies or sell to customary
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market power of the group itself and, in the case of a secondary
boycott, the additional market power of conscripted neutrals. The
impact of a supplier's boycott, for example, would depend on (1)
how essential the supplied product is to the victim's operations-a
function of the availability and cost of substitute supplies; (2) what
share of the market in the supplied product the victim usually buys;
and (3) what share of the relevant market the group controls.
Without such an examination of the facts of any given boycott, the
precise amount of economic harm which the boycott will cause
cannot be determined. It can only be said that as the share of the
relevant market controlled by the combination increases, and the
availability of substitutes decreases, the impact on the victim caused
by the boycott will become increasingly harmful.
In secondary boycott situations the level of economic harm
suffered by the victim is determined by the market power of the
neutrals that the group can persuade to boycott. The amount of
influence that the group can bring to bear on.the neutrals depends
in the first instance on the group's market power. With respect to
group facilities, the amount of harm caused by the denial of access
is directly related to the significance of the competitive advantage
which access provides. 27 The competitive advantage provided by
access can vary from the determinative-membership in a news
wireservice for a newspaper 2 8-_to the marginal-membership in a
rather inactive trade association.2 9 It is impossible to make
predictions about the economic harm to the victim from a denial of
such access without an examination of the facts of each case.
The argument that harm to the victim should not be given much
weight in the determination of a boycott's legality because the victim
buyers. Even if he is not driven out of business, he can be placed at a competitive disadvantage
by having either his purchasing or selling opportunities arbitrarily limited by the group's

action. To maintain sales in the face of a demand. boycott, he would have to raise his selling
costs to reach new sources of demand, while to maintain production when suppliers boycott,
he would have to pay more for his needed supplies, if any are available. The economic injury

to the victim is consequently one of the harms most frequently mentioned in the cases finding
boycotts illegal under the Sherman Act. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &

Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 213 (1959); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 42-43 (1930);

Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 311 (1923); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
27. See Coons, supra note 9; 30 U. CHi. L. REV., supra note 2 1.

28. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
29. Cf. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
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can always avoid the harm by acquiescing in the group's demands,
contains an unstated premise: that the group should be allowed to
force the victim to choose between surrender and economic harm.
This premise can be valid only if harm to the victim would be
outweighed by the interests which are to be advanced by the group.
There is a logical flaw in the argument which assumes a priori that
the benefits of group action outweigh the harms, and then uses this
assumption to justify slighting the importance of the harms in all
boycott situations.
In addition to the economic harm to the victim, a concerted
refusal to deal may cause a second kind of harm-injury to
competition in the market in which the victim sells or buys. If
suppliers boycott a certain retailer and deprive him of essential sales
items, the retailer cannot be as vigorous a competitor in the retail
market as he was before. Similarly, if retailers boycott a certain
supplier and force him to reduce his production, the competitive
force provided by the supplier's demand will be eliminated from the
market in which the supplier buys. The courts have emphasized on
several occasions that concerted refusals to deal can injure not only
the individual competitor, but competition as well. 30 Consequently,
in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court
came very close to equating harm to the victim from a suppliers'
boycott with harm to competition, with no more than a passing
reference to the structure of the market in which the victim sold:
[A concerted refusal to deal] is not to be tolerated merely because the victim
is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes
little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the
elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving
32
them out in large groups.

The degree of harm to competition resulting from the injury to
a competitor by a concerted refusal to deal cannot be estimated
without a fairly extensive analysis of market structure and
competitive behavior. For example, if the relevant market were
highly concentrated and the victim were the price cutting maverick
of the industry, significant impairment or destruction of the victim's
30. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914); Montague & Co. v. Lowry,
193 U.S. 38,45 (1904).
31. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
32. Id. at 213 (footnote omitted).
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ability to compete would obviously be far more detrimental to

competition than if the market were relatively unconcentrated or the
victim merely a price-taker. Even if the precise amount of injury

cannot be determined, it is clear, at any rate, that some injury to a
competitor will not improve competitive conditions in the relevant
market. Perhaps for this reason the Court in Klor's declined to

undertake such an extensive analysis, holding that allegations of
injury to the individual victim alleged sufficient harm to the public

interest in competition to state a cause of action under the Sherman
Act.:
Until now this discussion has centered on economic harms found
in varying degrees in all concerted refusal to deal situations.
Secondary boycotts and denials of access to a group facility contain

special potential for anticompetitive harm. In a secondary boycott,
the neutral may bear the brunt of the economic harms mentioned
previously, because the neutral who refuses to go along with the
group's demands to boycott another becomes himself the victim of
a primary boycott. If he decides to accede to the group's wishes, the
group has added his power to the economic power it already
possessed, and becomes that much more powerful.3 4 The neutrals are

compelled to choose between doing business with the combination or
doing business with the victims2 5 Whatever the neutrals' decision,
33. Two other types of economic harms involved in concerted refusal to deal situations have
been mentioned in the cases. Further inquiry will show, however, that they are either
restatements of harms previously discussed, or little more than makeweight arguments. Thus,
at times the courts have noted that one deleterious economic effect of a concerted refusal to
deal is the decline in the volume of interstate trade which occurs when the victim is cut off
from buyers or normal suppliers. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
213 (1959); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923). It is difficult to see
what economic or competitive interest is advanced by policies which preserve the volume of
interstate trade, aside from the rather narrow interests of interstate shipping companies. It is
more likely that the courts used the reduction in the volume of interstate trade as a
jurisdictional basis to justify federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, rather than as
an independent economic harm. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908).
Another economic harm which has been found in concerted refusals to deal is the limitation
on the freedom of action of the group members. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959). It is somewhat difficult to justify regarding this selfimposed limitation as an economic harm separate and distinct from the anticompetitive effects
harmful to outsiders resulting from the limitation. If a group of consenting adult businessmen
wanted to limit their individual freedom of action in a way that has no harmful
effect-economic or noneconomic-on others, it is hard to see why the Sherman Act should
stand in the way.
34. 30 U. CHi. L. REv., supra note 2 1, at 18 1.
35. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 441 (1910). In Grenada. the Court
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they stand to lose at the very least either the victim's business or the
group's business whichever is smaller.
There is still another danger to competition in situations
involving secondary boycotts or denials of access to group facilities,
where the group and the victim are usually competitors. The danger
is that a number of competitors will pool their economic power to
force other competitors to compete less vigorously or less effectively.
In these situations, there is a competitive risk if the victim either
resists the group's demands or gives in to them. In the former
situation, injury may result to the victim and to competition in the
market in which he competes, while in the latter situation, there will
be a possible reduction in the victim's competitive effectiveness. A
group might agree to boycott suppliers who continue to supply an
offending competitor until he discontinues any competitive practice,
':
including lawful practices, which the group might term "unfair.' 3
In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States,3 7 retail lumber dealers objected to competition from
wholesalers selling directly to consumers and, in effect, agreed to
boycott any wholesaler engaged in this trade practice, called by the
retailers "unfair dealing." 38 The threat to competition posed by
groups of competitors sitting in judgment on the propriety of other
competitors' trade practices-and willing to enforce those judgments
by inflicting economic harm on any dissenters-needs no
elaboration.
In summary, the most significant of the foregoing economic
harms are: (1)the economic injury to the victim, (2) the effect on
competition when the victim's ability to compete is undermined or
when the purpose and effect of the combination is to force the victim
to renounce certain competitive practices and become less
held that Mississippi did not violate the fourteenth amendment by requiring the dissolution
of a retail lumber dealers' association (which engaged in the same activities held illegal in
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)), for

violation of the Mississippi antitrust statute.
36. The converse of this situation occurred in Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), where certain dress manufacturers agreed to boycott retailers
purchasing dresses from certain other manufacturers who allegedly copied the dress designs
of group members. The object of the combination was to destroy competition from
manufacturers who copied dress designs of group members.
37. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).

38. Id. at 606.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970: 247

competitive, and (3) the harm to neutrals who are caught in the
middle of a secondary boycott .3
Noneconomic Harm in Concerted Refusal to Deal Situations,
Regardlessof Purpose
Concerted refusals to deal pose a noneconomic threat of a
different order. The argument, in one form, is that by pooling their
economic power the members of a concerted refusal to deal have in

effect established their own private government.40 They can
formulate their own standards of conduct and sanction violators

through the use of their collective economic power. In Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC,"' the Court called attention
to this aspect of concerted refusals to deal:
In addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-governmental
agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate
commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and
punishment of violations, and thus "trenches upon the power of the national
legislature and violates the statute." Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United

States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 [1899].42

Milton Handler has stated the argument differently and more
forcefully:
Just as price-fixing may be analogized to the imposition of a sales tax by
private parties for private purposes, a boycott smacks of a licensing system
likewise imposed by private groups for private purposes. The boycotting
39. It is difficult to see any difference in the scope or severity of economic harms caused
by a concerted refusal to deal where the group is assembled at one economic level rather than
another. Therefore, it is puzzling to read that "[o]ne type of group boycott which probably
should be outside the scope of the Sherman Act is the consumer boycott, because it
presumably reflects the play of market forces which that act meant to preserve." Note,
"'Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE
L.J. 567, 576 n.54 (1965). For a similar argument see Comment, Extrajudicial Consumer
Pressure: An Effective Impediment to Unethical Business Practices, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1011,
1045-53. There are market forces playing at all levels of the economy, and there is no reason
to think that the Sherman Act was concerned solely with the preservation of market forces
at the consumer level.
40. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465, (1941); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
41. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
42. 312 U.S. at 465. It should be noted that the quotation from Addyston Pipe was the
Court's response to the defendant's argument in that case that Congress's power under the
commerce clause was limited to the prevention of state obstructions of interstate commerce
and could not reach purely private obstructions.
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parties determine who shall enter, who 3shall remain in, and who shall be
excluded from a field of economic activity.

In essence, the argument is that the exclusionary powers of the
combination are "sovereign" powers which should only be exercised
"pursuant to legislative grant and subject to proper judicial
review." 44
A difficulty with this private government argument is that it
seems to apply only where the members of the combination possess
market power in a degree approaching a shared monopoly. No
persuasive private government objections could be made to a
combination which merely established standards of conduct which
are to be followed voluntarily by the members themselves and which
have only incidental effects on outsiders. For example, an agreement
among used car dealers not to disparage each other's cars or sales
practices might not be so objectionable. A combination becomes a
private government only when it has the willingness and the power
to coerce others to conform to its standards. Members of a
combination can limit themselves in any way they like which does
not impair competition, so long as they lack the power to force their
judgments on others. It should be obvious that not every
combination engaging in a concerted refusal to deal can muster
sufficient market power to warrant description as a private
government. Where the boycotting group's share of the relevant
market approaches 100 per cent, or access to the group facility is
essential for a business to compete effectively, it may be accurate to
speak of a private government exercising exclusionary powers which
only the sovereign should possess. But the problem of private
usurpation of essentially governmental powers is certainly not
present in all or most concerted refusals to deal.
Nevertheless, the policy behind the private government objection
to concerted refusals to deal may, if refined, still apply with
considerable force to a broad range of boycotting situations. The
argument would be that a potential for undesirable aggregations of
private power exists whenever groups are allowed to pool their
economic power for collective action in pursuit of private goals with
43. Handler, supra note 6, at 864.
44. FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No. 59, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP.
17,573, at 22,845 (FTC 1966). The language was used by the FTC in disapproving
the plans for a private group advertising review board proposed by the businessmen of a
certain locality.
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no more than self-imposed restraints on harms caused to others. The
danger is in the collective possession of power itself, not merely in
the use of collective power to achieve goals antithetical to public
policy, such as the suppression of competition. Group action without
effective review by some body or agency acting in the public interest
can be overzealous, arbitrary, and capricious even in the pursuit of
lawful and proper objectives. The point seems to be that groups
should not be able to join together to inflict economic harm on
others without some system of checks and balances like those
deemed necessary to prevent arbitrary action by governments." ' The
possibility of arbitrary action by a group would appear to exist
whenever the power to inflict more than minimal economic harm
exists, not just in those coercively successful boycotts where the
group exercises quasi-sovereign powers.
The difficulties involved in choosing between regulating the use
of private aggregations of power and preventing their existence
present recurring problems in the administration of the antitrust
laws. A fundamental question in noncommercial boycotts is whether
regulation of the exercise of group boycotting power can be effective
enough to allow the power to exist at all. The problems of finding
adequate regulatory institutions and setting appropriate guidelines
for regulation may well prove too complex in the light of the rather
limited benefits that analysis may show group boycotts capable of
producing.
The Relationship Between the Purpose of the Boycotting
Combinationand the Scope and Intensity of Resulting Harms
A question remains whether the harms involved in a concerted
refusal to deal for a noncommercial purpose" are likely to be more
or less significant than the harms experienced in a commercially
motivated refusal to deal. Arguably, the economic injury inflicted
would be less only if group action to achieve a noncommercial
purpose is less effective than commercially motivated group action.
If the group's purpose were noneconomic, it could be argued that
collective action is more likely to break down because the tie that
binds the combination together is not greed but some lofty purpose
45. See note 40supraand accompanying text.

46. It should be remembered that a "noncommercial" purpose can be either "economic"
or "noneconomic." Coons, supra note 9, at 712-13. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying
text.
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easily displaceable by greed. It could be argued just as convincingly,
however, that a group boycotting for a noneconomic purpose is
likely to be composed of zealots, who would be willing to impose
unremitting economic harm on the victim until their noneconomic
purpose is achieved. Thus, there seems little reason to think that the
harms involved in an economic or noneconomic concerted refusal to
deal would be any less because of the noncommercial nature of the
group's purpose.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL

In view of the economic and noneconomic harms accompanying
concerted refusals to deal, it is not surprising that the courts have
been reluctant to find that the benefits from a boycott outweigh the
harms. Responses by the courts to various attempts to demonstrate
the reasonableness of restraints imposed by boycotts are analyzed
below.
Justifications Based on Economic Advantage to the Combination
Where a combination inflicts economic harm on others simply
for the members' own economic benefit, their concerted refusal to
deal has uniformly been held to be a section 1 violation. These
decisions are easily supportable, for private efforts to restrain trade
to effect a redistribution of income from the victim to the group do
not deserve immunity from the operation of the antitrust laws.47
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. United Motion Picture Theatre
Owners" provides a good example of a concerted refusal to deal used
to advance the group members' economic interests. There, certain
theatre owners refused to purchase plaintiff's motion pictures until
more favorable contract terms were offered. The Third Circuit
without much difficulty ordered the lower court to enjoin this
conduct.4 9 Similarly, an agreement among master plumbers to
boycott manufacturers and dealers in plumbing supplies in order to
force them to sell to the public only through the master plumbers
was held to be a criminal conspiracy in restraint of trade."
47. This assumes the absence of a specific congressional exemption. For example, see the
partial exemptions given to agricultural organizations and labor unions by section 6 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
48. 93 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1937).
49. Id. at 720.
50. Knauer v. United States, 237 F. 8 (8th Cir. 1916).
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Before Congress granted labor unions an exemption from the
antitrust laws, 5 and before the courts gave more than a grudging
reading to the exemption, 52 the fact that the purpose of a union
boycott was to promote plant unionization and benefit workers-an
economic but noncommercial purpose-did not save the boycott

from illegality. In the famous Danbury Hatters case,"5 the
complaint, alleging that union members were boycotting a

manufacturer's products to force unionization of his plant, was held
sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.5 In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,55 more than ten years
later, even after the Clayton Act, the Court was equally unmoved

by the boycotting union's argument that its purpose was to get a
closed shop, an eight-hour day, and a union wage scale, and to
prevent the loss of these benefits already won from plaintiff's

competitors.5 Ultimately, congressional action was necessary to
make clear to the courts that section 20 of the Clayton Act deserved
a broader reading, and that strikes and primary boycotts to advance
the goal of unionization were not unlawful.57 This congressionally
sanctioned justification for labor boycotting activity has been
judicially recognized only where the activity has been sufficiently
related to the purpose of unionization.58
51. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
52. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Recent applications of
exemptions from the Sherman Act include Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676 (1965); U MW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
53. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
54. The precedential weight of Loewe is weakened by the fact that it was decided three years
before the Supreme Court adopted the so-called "rule of reason" in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Until Standard Oil, the Court had been operating under
the rule of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), which read
section I of the Sherman Act as broadening common law rules against restraints of trade and
outlawing every restraint of trade no matter how slight.
55. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
56. Id. at 480-81 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The case is remembered today more for its
tortured construction of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964), 29
U.S.C. § 52 (1964), than the Court's response to union attempts to justify the boycott.
57. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1964); Wagner Act, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Congress has never legalized secondary boycotts. Cf. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
58. I.P.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local 110, 132 F.
Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (union's motion to dismiss action against union for instructing its
members not to show a certain film denied, because legitimate union objectives do not include
suppression of films distasteful to the union). The Court has shown some reluctance to extend
to other groups the privilege granted to labor to use primary boycotts to advance union
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Concerted
refusals
to
deal except on
identical
terms-mechanisms utilized to enhance the bargaining power of the

group and to obtain more favorable contract terms than each could
get through individual bargaining-have met with a similar fate in

the courts. Refusal of distributors to lease films except on the basis
of a standard contract requiring arbitration of all disputes arising

under the contract was held illegal despite defendants' contention
that the arbitration provisions were well adapted to the needs of the

motion picture industry and had been worked out through extended
discussions among all the parties. 9 A boycott by distributors to
force an exhibitor out of business because he would not agree to deal

with all the distributors was held illegal without much discussion,"0
as the only justification the defendants offered for their action was

the advancement of their own business interests at plaintiff's
expense."

If an individual competitor lacks the bargaining power to

get a particular contract term, the courts apparently will not let him
join with other competitors and use their collective bargaining power
to compel the insertion of such a term in the contract, no matter
how desirable.
The rule developed in the foregoing cases is reasonable: attempts

by a group to use a concerted refusal to deal for no loftier purpose
than turning the terms of trade in their favor are illegal. There is
nothing in the legislative history or policies of the Sherman Act to

indicate that individuals should be privileged to form groups to
inflict economic harm on others for their own benefit. Commercial
refusals to deal designed to preserve dealers' profit margins 2 or the
objectives, in the absence of congressional action. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950) (contempt conviction for violating state court injunction against peaceful picketing to
encourage boycott where object of picketing was more Negro employment affirmed). Justice
Frankfurter would accord to a union the protection afforded by section 20 of the Clayton Act
only "[s]olong as [it] acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups
.
...
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) (emphasis added). But see New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (Norris-LaGuardia Act
prevented federal district court from enjoining Negro boycott and picketing to achieve higher
percentage of Negro employees in grocery store).
59. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930). Use of an
agreed standard-form lease contract in the one-way trailer rental business was enjoined in
United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 800, 806 (D. Kan.), affd
mem., 355 U.S. 10 (1957).
60. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
61. Id. at 301 (Argument for Defendants in Error).
62. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The Court held that an
agreement among Chevrolet dealers not to sell cars to "discounters" was a "classic
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price structure of a group 3 from pressure by competitors, have also
been struck down under this rationale.
Justification Based on Prevention of Arguably Unfair or Unlawful
Competitive Practices
It is very difficult to draw satisfactory lines between boycotts
for the group's economic advantage and boycotts to prevent trading
practices which are arguably illegal or unfair. Too often-these two
purposes coalesce in the same boycott. What seems unfair to
members of a particular industry may appear to disinterested
observers to be nothing more than vigorous but acceptable methods
of competitive struggle. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Association v. United States,4 lumber retailers thought it an unfair
pre-emption of their trading opportunities for wholesalers to sell
directly to lumber users and boycotted wholesalers who did so. The
Court properly enjoined the data dissemination activities essential to
the boycott, for if a group were to be allowed to set its own
standards of what constitutes "fair" competition and were to be
allowed to boycott to put pressure on a competitor deemed
"unfair," the protection afforded competition by the antitrust laws
would be minimal, at best.
Similar problems have arisen in the construction industry where
subcontractors object to the practice of general contractors called
"bid shopping." A general contractor presumably would use the
lowest subcontractor's bid in preparing his final bid on a given
construction project. If,
after winning the contract award, he asks
other subcontractors to underbid the subcontractor who was the
lowest initially, the contractor is engaging in bid shopping. For
obvious reasons, subcontractors resent this practice of renegotiating
their price after the general contractor gets the contract. Yet, it is
not readily apparent why-the general contractor's effort to get a
lower bid should be considered unfair, or unethical, or materially
conspiracy" in restraint of trade "not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the
collaborators' profit margins or their system for distributing automobiles . . . ." id. at 140,
146.

63. Taylor v. Local 7, Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
969 (1966) (refusal of defendant horseshoers to shoe any horses unless the owner agreed to

use union horseshoers exclusively held an illegal boycott, not a labor dispute within the
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act).

64. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. A similar objective was
involved in the boycott in Knauer v. United States, 237 F. 8 (8th Cir. 1916).
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different from his attempt to get the lowest possible price on building
materials. For this reason, when a group of subcontractors formed
a bid depository and, in order to prevent bid shopping, required that
general contractors using the depository agree to let the subcontract
to the lowest bidding depository member, the requirement was struck
down as an illegal boycott of nonmembers of the depository. 5
The case is harder when.the purpose of the boycott is to prevent
methods of dealing more vulnerable to challenge on grounds of
fairness. The courts, for the most part, have remained steadfast in
their condemnation of boycotts even when this justification has been
offered. The leading case in this area is Fashion Originators' Guild
of America v. FTC.6 6 Members of the women's garment industry
who claimed to be creators of original dress designs became
concerned over what they called "style piracy"-other
manufacturers copying their designs and selling the copies. To
eliminate this practice, the members agreed to refuse to sell to any
retailer who sold garments copied from members' designs. "An
elaborate system of trial and appellate tribunals '6 7 was established
to determine whether a garment in fact was a copy of a design
registered with the Guild. The FTC attacked the Guild as an "unfair
method of competition" under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,6 s and prevailed in the Second Circuit. 9 Affirming,
the Supreme Court noted that original dress designs could not be
copyrighted or patented and viewed the boycott as intended to
supress a form of competition unpalatable to the combination. 70 The
Court also affirmed the FTC's refusal to hear evidence offered by
the defendant as to the evils of style piracy and its illegality under
state law. "In the second place, even if copying were an
acknowledged tort under the law of every state, that situation would
not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain
interstate commerce in violation of federal law.' ' 7 When forced to
balance the competitive evils of the boycott against the benefit of
restraining conduct tortious under state law, the Court
65.
1964),
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository, 230 F. Supp. 186 (D. Utah
affd, 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966).
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Id. at 462.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
114 F.2d 80 (1940).
312 U.S. at 465, 467.

71. Id. at 468.
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unhesitatingly outlawed the boycott. 2 The value choice implicit in
the Court's decision has been spelled out elsewhere. "The fact that
the person boycotted is engaged in illegal activities is immaterial,
since no private group should ever have the power to impose
penalties or punishment on a stranger because of a wrong he may
have done. ' 73 The argument that tortious invasions of business
interests should be punished or compensated for only under the law,
with no power in a private group to add to the punishment at its
whim, seems unassailable.
There has been some confusion concerning the legality of
concerted refusals to deal to prevent other kinds of commercial
wrongs, such as breaches of contract. In 1905 the Supreme Court
affirmed a decree enjoining livestock buyers and slaughterers from
conspiracy to fix livestock prices, but permitted the joint
"establishing and maintaining [of] rules for the giving of credit to
dealers where such rules in good faith are calculated solely to protect
the defendants against dishonest or irresponsible dealers .

. . ."4 A

few years later, motion picture distributors, concerned about the
frequency of changes in theater ownership made by prior owners to
escape their contractual obligations, agreed to require cash dealing
or the posting of a standard deposit before dealing with a new owner
who refused to assume the prior owner's outstanding contracts. Such
an agreement was held illegal in United States v. First National
Pictures,Inc.75 Since there seems to be no valid reason to distinguish
boycotts to prevent torts from boycotts to prevent
breaches of
7
contract, the result in First Nationalseems sound. 1
72. The Court's ready disposition of the case may have been assisted by the presence of
restraints in addition to the boycott, such as prohibitions on members' participation in retail
advertising, regulations on sale days, and limitations on allowable discounts. Id. at 463.
73. Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 387, 400 (1942).

74. Swift &Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 394 n. 1 (1905).
75. 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
76. Although concerted refusals to deal to punish businessmen for wrongful conduct
unrelated to the proposed dealings have generally been held illegal, the courts have at times

been receptive to boycotts entered into to prevent dealings likely in themselves to be fraudulent.
See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (dissemination of
information in order to prevent contractors from fraudulently demanding delivery of cement
under more than one specific job contract did not violate section I of the Sherman Act).

Vol. 1970: 2471

NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTS

Justifications Based on the Advancement of Public Policy Goals
Unrelated to the Group'sImmediate Material Advantage
Protection of the public in a multitude of ways has been a
favorite, if not always successful, justification proffered for
concerted refusals to deal. 77 Union Circulation Co. v. FTC78 involved
the concern of a number of magazine subscription solicitation
agencies that the deceptive practices of many door-to-door
subscription salesmen were giving the entire industry an unsavory
reputation. To enhance agency discipline and control of salesmen's
conduct, the dominant agencies entered into "no-switching"
agreements by which they agreed not to hire any salesman who had
worked for another agency within the previous year. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Commission's finding
that these agreements constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act and hence an unfair method of competition
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.79 The Court of Appeals
found that the agreements raised barriers to new entry or expansion
by existing companies by deterring employees from taking the risk
of working for an expanding or new company which later might
have to discharge them, with a resultant cost to the employee of one
year's unemployment. In addition, the court may have believed that
there were equally effective ways of dealing with salesmen's
fraudulent or deceptive practices which would not raise such barriers
to entry. 0 In order for a noncommercial-economic or
noneconomic-purpose to save a boycott from illegality, at the very
least it must be clear that there is no way apart from the boycott to
deal with the problem adequately.
Furthermore, it is apparent that a noble purpose will not save a
concerted refusal to deal unless a sufficient connection is established
between the restraint imposed and the purpose to be achieved. For
example, in Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 81 a
77. The various approaches taken by the courts in reviewing concerted refusals to deal
where the purpose is related either tangentially or not at all to the economic self-interest of
the combination is the basis of this discussion. There is no bright line test which permits an
easy separation of these cases from those preceding. Often the purpose to advance public
policy goals will be inseparable from the purpose to advance the group's self-interest. The one
common characteristic of the cases discussed here is that the groups do not act with the
intention of obtaining an immediate material benefit for themselves.
78. 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
79. Id. at 658.

80. Cf.id.
81. 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920).
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number of state and local officials were enjoined from engaging in
and encouraging a boycott of plaintiff's magazine, which contained
allegedly un-American and pro-German sentiments of plaintiff's
principal stockholder, William Randolph Hearst. Relying on the
fact that the corporation "had published no objectionable matter in

its magazines, and it had nothing to do with the Hearst
newspapers, 8 2 the court avoided the harder question whether the
boycott would be justified if the magazines had contained thoughts
objectionable to the boycotting group.
Even in cases where the boycotting combination is acting solely

upon moral grounds, without any chance of confusing the good of
society and the good of their profit margins, justifications based on

noncommercial purposes have not been well received. The sending of
notices to book and magazine dealers which communicate a private
group's belief that certain publications violate the law and their
intention to seek prosecution was enjoined in American Mercury,
Inc. v. Chase.8 3 The court's opinion specifically rejected this
justification:
The defendants have the right of every citizen to come to the courts with
complaints of crime; but they have no right to impose their opinions on the
book and magazine trade by threats of prosecution if their views are not
accepted . . . . The facts that the defendants are actuated by no commercial
motive and by no desire to injure the plaintiff do not enlarge their rights in
this respect. . .

The FTC did not find a moral justification for a doctors' and
hospital's boycott of the products of a commercial blood bank to
be sufficient to outweigh the competitive harms in Community
Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc. 5 The opinion of the
Commission dismissed defendant's contention that buying and
selling blood for profit was immoral:
A group of private citizens, no matter how public spirited or altruistically
motivated, may not relegate to themselves the essentially governmental
function of determining the standards which will be applied in the interstate
operation of blood banks and band together to inhibit the development of
82. Id. at 411.
83. 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926).
84. Id. at 225. It should be noted that the defendants here went beyond a refusal to deal
to threats of criminal prosecution to get their views accepted. The comments of the court on
the potential evils of private enforcement of private moral judgments are quite in point,
however.
85. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,728 (FTC 1966), order set aside
and annulledon other grounds,405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969) (lack of FTC jurisdiction).
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licensed commercial banks which meet governmental but not their own selfimposed standards. Nor may they take such action because they hold the
opinion that the buying and selling of human blood is morally wrong. 6

In ruling upon these justifications, the courts have repeatedly
stressed the danger involved in allowing private combinations to set
their own standards of behavior and attempt to compel others,
through threats of economic and anticompetitive harm, to conform
87
to those standards.
Cases involving attempts by professional groups to advance the
ethical standards of their profession can raise complex problems of
antitrust and private government. Group action can range from
denial of membership in a professional association to those who do
not comply with the group's ethical standards to more coercive
practices, such as the secondary boycott involved in American
Medical Association v. United States.88 Believing that salaried
medical practice under contract was unethical because it put an
intermediary between doctor and patient, the Medical Society of the
District of Columbia expelled two members who engaged in contract
practice. In addition, the society warned hospitals that they might
lose its approval, which was essential to attract interns, if they
permitted expelled members to use hospital facilities, and threatened
members with expulsion for engaging in consultation with the
89
expelled doctors.
It would be very difficult for an antitrust court to resolve the
ethical questions raised by prepaid medical practice, especially when
such practice can undercut the fees and income of those on one side
of the argument. A court is in a real quandary when ethics and
group self-interest happen to coincide. 0 The court had little
difficulty, however, in condemninig this attempt through secondary
boycott to enforce compliance with the group's ethical standards:
Appellants are not law enforcement agencies; they are charged with no duties
of investigating or prosecuting, to say nothing of convicting or punishing
86. Id. at 23,036.
87. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
88. 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
89. This statement of facts is taken from an earlier opinion in the same case, 110 F.2d 703,
706 (D.C. Cir. 1940), upholding the sufficiency of the indictment in the principal case.
90. The fact that both the American Medical Association and the D.C. Medical Society
saw no ethical problems with contract practice unless the quality of medical services was
undermined or unless there was interference "with reasonable competition among the
physicians of a community," 130 F.2d at 238 n.23, may have eased the burden of decision in
this case.
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. . . . Except for their size, their prestige and their otherwise commendable
activities, their conduct in the present case differs not at all from that of any
other extragovernmental agency which assumes power to challenge alleged
wrongdoing by taking the law into its own hands. . . . [A]lthough persons
who reason superficially concerning such matters may find justification for
extra-legal action to secure what seems to them desirable ends; this is not the
American way of life."

The view of the District of Columbia Circuit has not gone

unchallenged. In 1952, the Supreme Court indicated in dictum that
there may be considerable room for ethical justifications in
concerted refusals to deal by professional societies.12 This
justification is much more likely to be accepted when offered not to
justify a secondary boycott, but where the concerted refusal to deal
takes the form of denial of membership in the professional society
and where lack of membership will not be a significant barrier to
professional advancement.
JustificationsHeld Sufficient to Outweigh Harms of Boycott
In the preceding cases the courts have consistently held that the
justifications offered, ranging from pure self-interest 3 to the
advancement of high public policy,94 were insufficient to outweigh
the harms caused by concerted refusals to deal. The inquiry into the
actual harms of the boycott in question has ranged from the
minimal 5 to the fairly detailed. 6 But based on whatever analysis
the court was willing to make, the harms have been held to outweigh
the benefits, and the concerted refusal to deal has been outlawed.
In a relatively few cases, however, a restraint which could be
91. 130 F.2dat 249.
92. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (dictum). See
also Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953, 954 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds sub non. Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). But see United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 48889 (1950) (attempted eithical justification for price-fixing rejected). Majorie Webster Junior
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 302 F. Supp. 459
(D.D.C. 1969).
For a discussion of the applicability of the antitrust laws to bar association minimum fee
schedules, see J. Leary & M. Douty, Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws: A
Preliminary Analysis, Sept. 1958 (American Bar Foundation Research Memo, Series No. 12),
cited in, S. OPPENEHIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS CASES AND CONIMENTs 130
n.16 (3d ed. 1968).
93. See notes 47-63 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 77-92 supra and accompanying text.
95. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
96. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).

Vol. 1970: 247]

NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTS

called a concerted refusal to deal has survived judicial scrutiny under
the antitrust laws. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,97 the

Court upheld the legality of a "call" rule, under which members
agreed to bid for grain sold on a "to arrive" basis only at the price
prevailing when trading ceased, until trading began the next day. The
rule was in effect a concerted refusal to deal except at a certain price
for a certain part of each day. The Board argued that the purposes

of the call rule were to reduce members' business hours and break
up a monopoly in "to arrive" grain. 8 These "benefits" were held

sufficient to outweigh the competitive harm arising from the limited
concerted refusal to deal.99 The refusal by Underwriters Laboratories
to test a fire alarm device which did not meet the Laboratories'

threshold standards of approval has been held lawful.' The fact that
the stockholders of the laboratory were insurance companies who

could have no competitive motive for arbitrarily denying the
Underwriters' seal to the plaintiff unquestionably facilitated the

court's decision.

01

Exclusionary conduct by sports leagues and sport trade

associations has been held justified in several cases.10 In Molinas v.
National Basketball Association,'0 3 a professional basketball player
who had been indefinitely suspended from the N BA for betting on

his own team charged the league members with engaging in a
concerted refusal to deal with him. The district court dismissed the

complaint, noting that "a disciplinary rule invoked against gambling
seems about as reasonable a rule as could be imagined."'0 4 When the

United States attacked the rules and regulations of the United States
97. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
98. Id. at 237.

99. The case retains vitality today primarily because of Justice Brandeis's listing of factors
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a trade restraint.
To determine that question [whether the restraint promotes or suppresses competition]
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 246 U.S. at 238.
100. Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), affd
men., 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).

101. Id. at 168.
102. See generally Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports
and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418 (1967).
103. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
104. Id. at 244.
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Trotting Association, providing for the licensing of tracks and
drivers and forbidding horses to race on tracks not members of or
sanctioned by the USTA, the regulations were upheld as reasonable
restraints, necessary to keep full records of horses' performance to
avoid "ringing," the practice of racing a horse under another
horse's name and record to get a handicap advantage.11*
With equal ease, a rule of the Professional Golfers' Association
restricting eligibility in PGA-sponsored tournaments was held lawful
and justified by the need "to insure that professional golf
tournaments are not bogged down with great numbers of players of
inferior ability."'06 The same court two months before had labeled
as illegal per se a condition on eligibility for bowling tournaments
sponsored by a state trade association of bowling alley owners which
required that the entrant have done his organized bowling only in
establishments owned by trade association members. 07 The court
was unimpressed by the argument that the eligibility rule was
necessary to prevent "sandbagging," the use of unreliably low scores
in handicap computation. Here, as in Union Circulation,'t 8 the
restraint was outlawed because it was more restrictive than necessary
to accomplish the purpose. Instead of denying eligibility to bowlers
doing any organized bowling in nonmember alleys, the rule could
have required merely that only scores obtained at member
establishments could be used in computing handicaps.
The lesson of these cases is that where a concerted refusal to deal
takes the form of an eligibility rule or limitation ancillary to but
essential for the operation of a lawful joint facility such as a trade
association or league, the rule can escape condemnation under the
antitrust laws. The rule or restraint must be sufficiently related to
the lawful purpose for which the joint facility is established,"" and
105. United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 79,954 (S.D. Ohio
1960).
106. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966).
107. Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).

108. See notes 78-80supra and accompanying text.
109. Therefore, there is some antitrust danger in giving league or trade association officials

blanket powers of expulsion or suspension for conduct "detrimental to the best interests" of
the league or association. If Molinas had been suspended from the NBA because he was a

conscientious objector or a member of the Ku Klux Klan, it is most probable that the
suspension would be held to constitute an illegal concerted refusal to deal. For an example of
a potentially dangerous grant of this kind of power to association officials, see United States
v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 76.954, 76.959 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
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must impose no more competitive harm than is necessary to
accomplish that purpose. If the restraint satisfies these conditions,
the fact that the joint facility or association has complete control
over access to the industry will not by itself make the restraint
unlawful.
There is one rather troubling case involving an alleged agreement
among motion picture producing and distributing companies to
refuse employment to certain industry personnel accused of
membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party or other
subversive organizations."" Several screenwriters, actors, or directors
have allegedly been "blacklisted" since 1947 when they refused to
testify about their political associations or beliefs before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. In 1961, a suit was brought
to enjoin the "blacklisting" as an unlawful concerted refusal to deal.
The case is yet to be heard on the merits. In Young v. Motion
Picture Association of America,"' the district court refused
plaintiffs' motion to preclude pre-trial discovery into their political
associations and beliefs on the ground that the need to control
Communist and subversive influences in motion pictures might be
relevant in determining the legality of the boycott. If the inquiry
were allowed in order to determine if each individual defendant could
have had proper individual reasons for refusing to hire the plaintiffs
regardless of the action taken by his competitors, then the district
court's decision may have some validity. It would seem, however,
that the determination of the interdependence of the defendants'
employment decisions should presumably be based on what was
known at the time about plaintiffs' beliefs and associations, not what
they actually were. If the inquiry were allowed because the court
believed that defendants' purpose of rooting out elements they
deemed subversive from the motion picture industry might be
sufficient justification, the district court's approach must be rejected.
Ad hoc private aggregations of economic power employed to
regulate political associations and beliefs in an industry are the least
deserving of protection from the operation of the antitrust laws." '
110. Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
111. 28 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 1961). In Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 299 F.2d
119 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction against the boycott on grounds of adequate remedy at law, laches, and
an unwillingness to supervise the employment practices of an entire industry.
112. 74 YALE L.J., supra note 39.
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Justifications Based on Statutory Mandate, Express or Implied
In certain rare instances, Congress has acted to impose, explicitly
or impliedly, a duty of self-regulation on an industry. For example,
section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193413 requires for
an exchange's registration as a national securities exchange that
"the rules of the exchange include provision for the expulsion,
suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade . . . ."
Congress clearly contemplated that national securities exchanges
would enforce those exchange rules and regulations found by the
SEC to be "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect
investors,"" 5 and would do so through exclusionary activities which
might otherwise violate the antitrust laws.
The most recent and most celebrated conflict between an
exchange's power of self-regulation and the policies of the Sherman
Act occurred in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange."' The
Exchange ordered its members to remove private direct telephone
wire connections between their offices and the office of Mr. Silver,
a Texas over-the-counter broker-dealer. The direct-wire connections
were necessary to get the accurate and rapid security price
quotations essential for the conduct of the broker-dealer's business.
The Exchange gave Silver no notice or opportunity to be heard
before issuing its order and refused to divulge the reasons for its
order until his treble damage suit based on allegations of a concerted
refusal to deal was brought." 7 The Court first observed that the
concerted refusal of Exchange members to deal with the plaintiff
would be unlawful per se in the absence of the statutory duty of selfregulation imposed by the Exchange Act. The Court seized upon the
denial of notice and opportunity for a hearing, and held that, as a
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

15 U.S.C. § 78a (1964).
Id. § 78f(b).
Id. § 78f(d).
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
The reasons disclosed in the district court's opinion for the Exchange's action were:

(1) Silver's failure to list on his application two corporations with which he and his wife had
been connected; (2) the Silvers' security clearance had been suspended by the Defense

Department under the Industrial Personnel Security Program held unlawful and void in
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); (3) the Silvers had taken stock under an "investment
letter" and sold it two months later; and (4) the Exchange had further information
"derogatory to the Silvers" which it declined to reveal. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
196 F. Supp. 209, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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result, the Exchange "plainly exceeded the scope of its authority
under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation and
therefore has not even reached the threshold of justification under
that statute for what would otherwise be an antitrust violation."" 8
In essence, Silver stands for the proposition that, even where
Congress has authorized the pooling of economic power required for
self-regulatory boycotts, the institution can validly exercise the
boycotting power only by observing the bare minimum of procedural
steps which fairness requires-notice and an opportunity for a
hearing."19 Where private power is allowed to aggregate, Silver
imposes due process safeguards on the exercise of that power.
THE SEARCH FOR AN APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE

PROBLEMS OF NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTS

An obvious response to noncommercial concerted refusals to deal
would be to apply the general rule-found in several Supreme Court
dicta' 20-for
commercial boycotts to noncommercial boycotts and
hold that all noncommercial boycotts are illegal per se. Nevertheless,
there is some question whether the Supreme Court really means it
when it says that all commercial boycotts are per se violations of
the Sherman Act. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,12 1 has
been interpreted by many 22 as the latest expression of this approach.
In Klor's, a San Francisco appliance store alleged that a department
store chain, Broadway-Hale, had used its buying power to induce ten
national appliance manufacturers and their distributors to stop
selling to the plaintiff. The defendants submitted affidavits to show
that the boycott had no discernible effect on competition in the
consumer retail appliance market. The district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there had
been no "public wrong" proscribed by the Sherman Act, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
118.

373 U.S. at 365.
119. See also Cowen v. New York Stock Exchange, 256 F. Supp. 462 (N.D.N.Y. 1966),
affd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967) (Exchange's good faith efforts to discipline plaintiff for
violations of equitable principles of trade are exempted from the antitrust laws) (dictum).
120. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1963) (dictum); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (dictum); United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948) (dictum).
121. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
122. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
123. 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
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the boycott's harm to an individual trader constituted sufficient
public injury for Sherman Act liability to attach. Justice Black
stated that -[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to
deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden
[per se] category."'"The problem with Klor's is that it is difficult to derive a per se
rule from a case in which the defendants offered no justification
whatsoever for their conduct' 25 An equally plausible reading is that
the Court summarily reviewed the harms, benefits (of which none
were alleged), and less-restrictive alternatives to the boycott and
expressed its conclusion in a summary formulation.'", A hint that the
Court did not really adopt a true per se rule is contained in the
Court's dictum in Silver that the Exchange's termination of the
direct-wire connections would be illegal per se "'absent any
justification derived from the policy of another statute or otherwise
...
•127 Regardless of the resolution of the question whether the
Supreme Court has adopted a rule of per se illegality for commercial
boycotts, inquiry should not be foreclosed into the relative merits of
a per se approach to noncommercial boycotts.'2 8 If the problem of
noncommercial boycotts lends itself to resolution by means of a per
se rule, then a per se rule should be adopted no matter what course
the law takes concerning commercial boycotts.
An alternative judicial response would be to follow the lead of
the lower court cases holding that only commercial boycotts are
illegal per se. 29 Noncommercial boycotts would be judged
individually through a balancing of each's harms and benefits. To
know the harms involved, the court would have to examine in some
detail the market structure and past market behavior in the markets
124. 359 U.S. at 212.
125. See Question Presented, Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 3, Klor's, Inc. v.

Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
126. See 359 U.S. at 213.
127. 373 U.S. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
128. The Court in Klor's seemed receptive to the possibility of distinguishing commercial
from noncommercial boycotts, observing in a footnote that the Sherman Act "is aimed

primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited
extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives." 359 U.S.
at 213 n.7.
129. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949, 955 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (only
commercial concerted refusals to deal marked by coercive economic pressure are illegal per
se). United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 79,954 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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in which the victim buys and sells. The court would also have to
determine what noneconomic or noncommercial policy goals
motivate the concerted refusal to deal, their desirability, and the
probability of their realization or significant advancement by the
group's action. Then the court would have to balance economic
harms against benefits to society from the concerted refusal to deal
and determine whether, in the aggregate,3 harm or benefit
prevailed-a kind of "rule of reason" approach. :1
The per se rule and the rule of reason are the polar alternatives
for possible judicial responses to the problem of noncommercial
boycotts. A multitude of intermediate approaches are possible
through manipulation of the burden of proof to impose on
defendants whatever burden of establishing the validity of their
justification is desired, or through defining the categories of
justifications to which the courts will listen. It seems clear that
plaintiffs should not have to disprove the existence or the value of
whatever public policy justifications are offered by the defendant.
But beyond that, it is not at all clear which justifications should be
listened to, or what burden of persuasion should be placed on the
defendant. Thus, should the defendant be required to show only that
benefits will outweigh harms, or that benefits will substantially
outweigh harms? The following analysis will focus on the advatitages
and disadvantages of the possible judicial approaches to
noncommercial boycotts and attempt to derive the basics of a sound
approach.
Application of the Rule of Reason to Noncommercial Boycotts:
Benefits and Costs
At the outset, it should be noted that applying the rule of reason
to the typical noncommercial concerted refusal to deal would be a
long and arduous task. In order to determine the probable effects
on the victim caused by a primary boycott, the court would have to
estimate the market power possessed by the combination. This
estimate requires answers to difficult economic questions. First, what
are the limits of the relevant market? This raises the problems of
availability and sufficiency of substitutes for the combination's
product. Second, what is the combination's share of the relevant
market? And, finally, what portion of the relevant market must the
130. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See note 99 supra.
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victim be able to buy or sell in order to stay in business or compete
effectively?
In order to determine the extent of competitive harm, the court
would have to examine in detail the structure and past behavior of
the market in which the victim buys or sells to determine if
impairment of his ability to compete would significantly affect
competition in that market. If denial of access to a joint facility were
the basis of the alleged violation, the court would have to determine
how crucial access to the facility was to the excluded party's ability
to compete and the extent of harm to competition from the
impairment of the victim's competitive ability. In a secondary
boycott situation the court would have to estimate not only the
market power of the combination, but also the market power of
those at the different economic level whom the combination can
coerce into implementing the actual boycott. Economic questions of
this kind cannot be answered without lengthy and highly complex
factual inquiry and sometimes cannot be answered with a fair
amount of certainty even with such an inquiry. It was the difficulty
of getting reliable answers to questions such as the effect on
competition from the loss of one competitor or the relationship
between market structure and market power which led the Court to
the use of presumptions based on market shares in horizontal merger
cases. '31
Most questions of economics, however, are at least susceptible
to reasoned analysis. This is not necessarily true when the court
turns to the benefits side of the balancing act. There are two
troubling problems confronting a court weighing competitive harms
against asserted beneficent public policies implemented. First, by
what standard is the court to weigh the various public policy goals
which may be alleged as justifications by the combination? Second,
how competent is the court to distinguish boycotts genuinely
motivated by a noncommercial purpose from those alleging such
purpose but motivated in fact by an exclusionary purpose?
In the absence of explicit legislative endorsement or prohibition,
the purposes for which a group may decide to inflict economic harm
can range from the barely legal to the highly desirable. For example,
if John Birch Society members* were to agree to boycott a grocery
chain selling Polish hams, the Society would argue that the purpose
131. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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of the boycott was to put economic pressure on a totalitarian regime.
The grocery chain could assert that it was "building bridges to the
East" by selling the hams and planned to continue to sell imported
foods until prohibited by the Department of State. It would make
most judges distinctly uncomfortable to have to choose between
those two competing policies. Policy decisions of that magnitude are
essentially legislative, ill-suited to the judicial process, and should be
made only by the elected representatives of the people. There is no
body of precedent available to judges to guide them in their choice.
The only justification that judges could offer for their decisions is
that in their opinion the value of the public policy goals asserted
either did or did not outweigh the economic harms caused by the
boycott. The rule of reason approach would call upon judges to
decide cases based on nothing more convincing or persuasive than
their own set of values and policy preferences which may or may not
be shared by the public at large or their elected representatives. As
one commentator has phrased it, "[t]he Sherman Act, moreover, is
not an invitation to de novo judgments by courts as to the
desirability of goals sought to be achieved by anticompetitive
3
practices."1' 1
There are those, like Professor John E. Coons, who are confident
in the ability of courts operating under the Sherman Act to
distinguish "among the noneconomic goals of defendants on the
basis of policies unrelated to the protection of competition." 133 The
one example he cites, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,'134 would not provide much reassurance
to those concerned about the competence of courts to weigh
competing public policy justifications in noncommercial boycott
situations. In Noerr, the Supreme Court held that an organization
of railroads could not be held liable under the antitrust laws for
instigating a public relations campaign-at times unethical-to
obtain tighter state restrictions on the operations of their
competitors, the truckers. 135 It is difficult to infer from the Court's
affirmance of the people's right to petition state governments,
certainly a basic and protected freedom, a broader competence or
willingness in judges in general to make policy choices where the
132. 74 YALE L.J.,supra note 39, at 579.
133. Coons, supra note 9, at 709.
134. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

135. Id. at 139-40.
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values are not so clear-cut. The problems of choice will multiply
where state policy differs from federal policy, or where federal policy

is unformulated and state policies vary.
Some of the difficulties inherent in the rule of'reason approach

have been experienced by state court judges called upon to decide
whether a concerted refusal to deal was a tortious invasion of the
victim's rights or was privileged. The Restatement of Torts sets out

in section 765 some "important factors" bearing on the issue of
justification or privilege, which may serve as an appropriate

summary of the factors noted previously. 3 But stating the variables
does not tell the court how to weight them or how to decide cases.

As a result, some courts, utilizing means other than the Sherman
Act, have retreated from the onerous task of choosing among
competing values and policy justifications.'3 7 The rule of law has
developed that economic actors are privileged to refuse to deal il

combination as a means of advancing their own economic selfinterest. 3 When forced to choose among competing values, the state
courts had to and did abdicate their responsibility by recognizing a
3
privilege of immense scope. 1

The response to the questioning of judges' competence and
willingness to choose among competing public policy goals could be

the argument that one of the reasons for having a judiciary is to have
:36. [T]he following are important factors:
(a) the objects sought to be accomplished and the interests sought to be advanced
by the actors' conduct;
(b) the extent of the hardship caused to the person against whom the actors'
conduct is directed and his opportunities for mitigating the hardship;
(c) the appropriateness of the actors' conduct as a means of advancing their
interests and the availability of less harmful means to that end;
(d) the relations between actors and the person against whom the conduct is
directed and their relative economic power;
(e) the effects of the actors' conduct and of its objects on the social interest in
business enterprise and competition. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765 (1939).
137. See Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn."223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893); Macauley v.
Tierney, 19 R.I. 225, 33 A. (1895); cf Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1929);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. South Dakota Retail Merchants' & Hardware Dealers' Ass'n,
150 F. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1907).
138. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765, Illustration 6 (1939) reads: "The members of an
association of retailers agree to refuse and do refuse, to patronize a wholesaler who also sells
at retail in the market which they serve. Their refusal is justified under the rule stated in this
section." See Edelstein v. Gillmore. 35 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1929) (Actors Equity Association
members' concerted refusal to deal with agents except on standard terms not enjoined because
purpose was to advance members' self-interest).
139. See note 137 supra.
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men who can make hard choices, and the difficulty in making the
choice is no reason not to attempt it. This argument is not wholly
satisfactory, however. First, it is not entirely clear that it is the
province of the judiciary to make the sweeping value judgments
which ruling on noncommercial justifications for concerted refusals
to deal would require. Second, there should be available some more
fundamental ground of decision to justify the hard choices which
have been made than the set of values of an individual federal judge.
Finally, the argument assumes that reaching the "right" result in
each noncommercial concerted refusal to deal is worth the costs it
imposes on the courts and enforcement agencies in terms of lengthy
factual inquiry and complex balancing of values.
There is a second problem in addition to questions of legitimacy
and judges' competence to make the broad range of value choices
that the rule of reason would require. Questions of motive and
purpose are particularly tricky questions of fact. It is not at all
inconceivable that combinations might seek to justify their
combination for exclusionary purposes by wrapping it in the mantle
of high public policy. At times the evasion is transparent, as in
Eastern States"" where retailers attempted to justify their boycott of
wholesalers who sold to consumers directly by arguing that the
boycott was "necessary to the protection of the retail trade and
promotive of the public welfare in providing retail facilities
.
. ,,""' But where the combination's members are not quite so
candid about equating self-interest with the public interest,
determination of the group's true purpose may not be so easy. For
example, the gas trade association which refused its seal of approval
to the plaintiff's burner in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co.,142 might have had nothing but the public safety
in mind. Yet, it is equally posiible that the association was trying
to exclude the burner from the market because it was superior to the
members' products or used too little gas. Without a voluminous
study of the safety characteristics of the various burners-a study
for which the average judge has neither the time nor the technical
training-there is no way of determining which purpose was the real
purpose of the group.
The problem of exclusionary purposes masquerading as public
140. See notes 37-38, 64supra and accompanying text.

141. 234 U.S. at 613.
142. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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policy purposes can arise only where a group is putting economic
pressure on a competitor. But when it does arise, it is a problem of
considerable difficulty even though, in a few cases, judges have been
able to unmask the group's real purpose.' Moreover, the rule of
reason provides no easy answers to the problem of mixed
commercial and noncommercial motives. For example, suppose the
motion picture companies in Young' had alleged two purposes for
their political blacklist of certain actors, directors, and screenwriters:
(1) to do their part to fight what they regarded as Communist
attempts to subvert the movie industry and (2) to increase public
confidence in the motion picture industry and attract the public back
into movie theaters. To decide the legality of the blacklist under the
rule of reason, the court would first have to determine how
important the noncommercial purpose has to be to immunize the
boycott from the antitrust laws. Must it be the only purpose, the
dominant purpose, a significant purpose, or merely a purpose
present in some degree? This is another question not capable of easy
resolution. The point is that following the rule of reason approach
to noncommercial boycotts will involve great expenditures of time
and effort to reach an appropriate result. Whether or not the
expenditures must be made is discussed immediately below.
Advantages and Disadvantages of a Per Se Approach to
Noncommercial Boycotts

The distinguishing feature of the per se approach is a stringent
limitation approaching an outright prohibition on certain
justifications for boycotting conduct. The advantages of a per se rule
can be easily stated. By avoiding the need for both a detailed
analysis of market structure and conditions and the delicate
weighing of competing public policy interests, a per se rule would
save a great deal of time, for both the enforcement agencies and the
courts. In addition, a per se rule provides a bright line indicator
separating lawful from unlawful conduct and facilitating public
compliance with the law. The cost of adopting a per se rule is the
outlawing of those concerted refusals to deal (1) which would be
upheld by a court employing the rule of reason approach and (2)
143. United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (purpose of

Board's membership restrictions was not to preserve the independence of insurance agents as
alleged but to protect their policy expiration rights).
144. See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
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which should be upheld because the benefits to society and the
economy outweigh the harms involved-"'

Justice Black sounded some familiar themes in indicating why
the Court has taken a per se approach toward certain, trade

practices:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of
everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of
the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine
at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken.'

The case for a per se approach to noncommercial boycotts thus rests

ultimately on the proposition that in comparing the broad range of
harmful and beneficial boycotts, the aggregate of harm in all the

harmful boycotts so far outweighs the aggregate of benefit in
beneficial boycotts that "the cost of distinguishing harmful and
beneficial situations by an examination of the relevant circumstances
' 47
is not worth incurring.'

The deciding issue is what interests would be sacrificed by

making noncommercial boycotts illegal per se that would not be lost
under a rule of reason approach. The gain in lessened administrative

burdens and ease of enforcement would then have to be balanced
against this cost to reach a decision as to the merits of a per se
approach to noncommercial boycotts. The adoption of a per se rule
would discourage a number of concerted refusals to deal where the
benefits would have outweighed the harms. It would overstate the

costs of a per se rule, however, to use this number of beneficial
boycotts deterred as an indication of cost. A certain number of these
145. The per se rule has a corollary advantage in that it outlaws those concerted refusals
to deal where a court applying the rule of reason would erroneously find that the benefits of
the boycott exceeded the costs. Both the cost mentioned in the text and this minor advantage
are premised on the assumption that the values or benefits and their ranking are sufficiently
clear so that a decision can be said to be "correct" or "erroneous." If this is not true, then
there is no cost at all to having a per se rule.
146. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
147. C.

143 (1959).
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boycotts would have been deterred even by a rule of reason
approach, because the members of the combination may lack
confidence in their ability to impress a judge with the validity of
their justification. The number deterred by a rule of reason may be
fairly high in view of the inherent unpredictability of results when
judges' own values become the criterion for decision. Therefore, the
cost of a per se rule would be the number of beneficial boycotts
deterred, which would not have been deterred by a rule of reason
approach-where the combination would have had a chance to offer
its justification. The loss caused by the deterrence of these beneficial
boycotts would be the failure of certain desirable public policy goals
to advance closer to realization because the combination was not
allowed to inflict economic injury to promote these goals.
The desirability of the public policy goals which a group might
seek to advance by a boycott may vary widely. The combination's
objective could be clearly illegal, for example, a boycott to force a
certain businessman to discriminate on the basis of race in his hiring
practices. 48 The proposition that boycotts designed to achieve an
illegal object should be illegal per se seems indisputable. 4 '
Alternatively, the group's purpose could be lawful, although not the
object of particular solicitude under any state or federal statute. A
boycott to force a store to close on Sunday in a jurisdiction without
Sunday closing laws would exemplify this alternative. The group's
purpose could be an objective which Congress or a state legislature
has endorsed without indicating any desire for private groups to take
affirmative action to implement its declaration of policy. This kind
of purpose would be found in a boycott against businesses which do
discriminate in their hiring practices, or which stay open on Sunday
in a jurisdiction requiring Sunday closing. Finally, the objective
sought may be a purpose.endorsed by Congress which clearly
contemplated the use of boycotts as necessary enforcement
mechanisms, as in the case of stock exchange self-regulation in
50
Silver.
One more refinement is required before undertaking the task of
148. See 42 U.S.C. §

2

000e-2(a) (1964).

149. See United States v. American Livestock Comm'n Co., 279 U.S. 435, 438 (1929)
(members of American Livestock Association would not commit an unfair practice under the
Packers and Stockyards Act by refusing to deal with Producers Commission Association,
where such dealings by PCA would be ultra vires) (dictum).
150. See notes 116-19 supra and accompanying text.
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balancing the losses to be incurred under a per se rule against the
benefits achieved in terms of lessened administrative burdens and
increased ease of enforcement. The possible existence of a less
harmful alternative to a boycott should be recognized in the balance.
Even under a per se rule, the combinations would be able to advance
their public policy objectives through the use of the "safer and more
kindly weapons of legitimate persuasion and reasoned argument
... "'s5 Therefore, the cost of a per se rule must be discounted by
the degree to which the group would be able to advance their
desirable policy objectives without the use of their collective
economic power. The cost of adopting a per se rule then becomes
the loss of the marginal increase in the level of group public policy
purpose achievement provided by the use of the group's economic
power but unattainable by legitimate persuasion and reasoned
argument alone.
Even with the above refinement, there is no way to measure the
costs of a per se rule with any precision. Some have argued that the
loss would be great for those groups whose powers of peaceful
persuasion are limited and must therefore be able to resort to their
collective economic power to achieve their objectives. Chief Judge
Traynor of the California Supreme Court made the argument in a
case involving the right of Negroes to boycott a store to obtain
preferential hiring of Negroes:
In their struggle for equality the
have is the purchasing power they
to open jobs to them. . . . Only
justify judicial rules that restrict
economic power to secure economic

only effective economic weapon Negroes
are able to mobilize to induce employers
a clear danger to the community would
the peaceful mobilization of a group's
equality.152

This is a cost to be sure, but its significance is open to question. The
statement contains an unstated premise with which not all would
agree. The statement assumes that if a group is unable to achieve
its noncommercial goals by persuasion and reasoned argument, it
should be allowed to advance those goals by inflicting economic
harm on others. This is valid only under a further assumption that
it is better in some situations to have economic conflict and warfare
than for a group's goals to fall short of realization by the increment
which concerted economic pressure alone can provide.
151. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
152. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 868, 198 P.2d 885, 896 (1948) (dissenting

opinion). afJfd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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The question then becomes in how many situations is the above
assumption valid, and how significant are these situations. It is
submitted that the situations would be rare enough so that the costs
of a per se rule would be outweighed by the gains. To talk of a
group's valid interest in promoting its goals is to mention only one
side of the equation. There is an interest in the victim's ability to
promote the lawful public policy objectives of which he approves, as
well as his interest in free access to markets unrestrained by
concerted group action for noncommercial goals. One of the
interests deserving protection under the Sherman Act is the public
interest in decentralized economic decisionmaklng and the
prevention of aggregations of economic power from imposing their
will on those lacking the power to resist effectively. 3
In a proper weighing of harms and benefits, it does not seem
likely that the marginal increment of goal achievement obtainable
only by concerted economic pressure would very often be worth the
costs in terms of economic harm. The marginal increment of goal
achievement would be significant only in those cases in which the
group's goals are incapable of adequate protection by noncoercive
group action or governmental action, either because of the inherent
nature of the goals' 5 or because the group lacks effective means of
reasoned argument and peaceful persuasion. It is not easy to imagine
the above conditions prevailing very frequently. It could be argued
that, where possible, private resolution of disputes is preferable to
public resolution for a variety of possible reasons, such as speedier
resolution and the group's greater access to potentially intricate facts
useful in settling the dispute. Once again, this comparison is
misleading. The proper comparison is among private resolution by
noncoercive means, private resolution by economic warfare, and
public resolution, which complicates matters considerably.
If, as argued above, the proper. question is not where group
action can be helpful, but where group action implemented by
concerted refusals to deal can be significantly helpful and group
action relying on peaceful persuasion cannot, the force of a great
many of the arguments against a per se rule for noncommercial
boycotts is considerably weakened. Statements such as the following
comment on Radiant Burners'55 illustrate such weakness:
Perhaps the greatest danger of applying a per se rule to trade associations is
153. See generally 74 YALE L.J., supra note 39.
154. For example, the protection of religious dogma might be such a goal.
155. See notes 25-26, 142 supra and accompanying text.
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that fear of treble damage actions may discourage many economically and
socially desirable group self-betterment activities ....
In [Radiant Burners],
the defendants were prepared to justify their activities on the ground that
public reaction to applicance failures reduced the market for gas appliances
and consequently for gas itself. Self-imposed restrictions as to manufacturing
standards thus could provide the public with more dependable appliances and,
by encouraging public acceptance of gas appliances, benefit all segments of
the gas industry. These positive functions of trade associations should not be
overlooked when evaluating the wisdom of applying a rule of per se
illegality."'

The point of the complaint in Radiant Burners was not that the
manufacturers of gas appliances had set safety standards for their
own appliances, but that gas companies would not install appliances
or supply gas for them if they failed to meet these standards. 57 That
trade associations and other forms of group action can have
beneficial results is not in dispute. What is in dispute is how
frequently the members have to be able to pool and use their
collective economic power to accomplish the beneficial results.
In summary, the case for making all noncommercial boycotts
illegal per se rests on the following propositions. First, it is unlikely
that in very many cases the benefit to society from the additional
increment of group goal realization, achieved by allowing groups to
go beyond peaceful persuasion and use their collective economic
power, will be worth the costs in terms of economic harm. In other
words, in a proper weighing of interests under the rule of reason
approach, most noncommercial concerted refusals to deal would be
held illegal. Second, attempting to sift out of all the noncommercial
boycotts those instances where the value of the marginal goal
achievement outweighs the harm would place a burden on the
enforcement agencies and judicial system clearly disproportionate to
the aggregate of benefits to be achieved. It is submitted that the
sounder arguments establish the validity of both these propositions,
58
and that all noncommercial boycotts should be illegal per se.
This result may seem to call for an intrusion by the federal
judiciary into the conduct of public affairs of potentially unlimited
scope. If members of a church youth group stop patronizing a
certain drug store until the owner stops selling salacious magazines,
156. Note, Antitrust: Trade Association's Refusal to Deal Held a Per Se Violation, 1961
DuKE L.J. 302, 306.

157. 364 U.S. at 658.
158. See notes 162-77 infra and accompanying text, for an exception to such a per se rule.
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is this a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act to be
remedied by a treble damage action? The requirement that the
boycott affect interstate commerce would be the first barrier to such
de minimis actions 5 The requirement of "agreement" may well
prove a more formidable barrier. In the absence of explicit
agreement among the members of a combination, it is unlikely that
any sufficient showing of interdependence of decisions can be made
in most consumer boycott cases. 6 ' Finally, after Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference,' it is unlikely that the antitrust laws would
be construed to prevent group activities aimed at providing
information to the public, which may or may not induce others to
refuse to deal on an individual basis with a certain party, so long
as no interdependence of decision is found.
FASHIONING AN EXCEPTION TO THE PER SE RULE: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS

If it were possible to describe with sufficient precision certain
categories of concerted refusals to deal where the increment of public
policy purpose achievable only by boycott would be likely, in a
significant number of cases, to outweigh the harms involved, then
certain exceptions to the per se rule should be made. If the majority
of the cases in which a proper rule of reason approach would legalize
the boycott could be found within the confines of a well-defined
category, then the case for applying a per se approach to cases
outside that category would become substantially more convincing.
Thus, a carefully drawn exception could provide the best of both
worlds-summary disposition of cases where harms are likely to
outweigh benefits most of the time, and preservation of the court's
time for a reasoned analysis of those boycott cases where advantages
are likely to outweigh the social costs involved. The exception must
be carefully drawn in order to prevent lengthy controversy over
whether a given boycott fits vitrhin the exception, for such
considerations, if prolonged, would dissipate the primary advantages
of the per se approach.
159. See note 14supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 12-19supra.
161. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text. This proposition is but a logical
extension of the rationale of Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference to cases where the right
of free speech is involved instead of the right to petition governmental agencies for the redress

of grievances.
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Several attempts have been made to define categories of
concerted refusals to deal which should be tested under the rule of
reason rather than outlawed as illegal per se. One suggested line of
demarcation distinguishes between concerted refusals to deal
intended to coerce the conduct of third parties or secure their
removal from competition and concerted refusals to deal without
those intentions and involving no more than the acceptance of
6 2 There are
limitations on individual freedom to deal.1
two problems
with defining the exception in these terms. First, it requires
determination of intent or purpose, and one of the reasons urging
the adoption of a per se rule was the difficulty in isolating the "real"
purpose motivating a certain action. Second, since any self-limiting
refusal to deal has effects on third parties,' applying this test would
involve a determination of whether the effect on third parties or
competition is direct or indirect,'64 thereby adding another complex
variable to the analysis. Another commentator would exempt from
the per se rule only those boycotting activities of a self-regulatory
nature which affect solely the interrelations of the members. 6 '
There seem to be no pressing reasons to exempt primary or
secondary boycotts from the operation of the per se rule. It is only
concerted refusals to deal involving denial of access to group
facilities which present rather troubling problems. There are certain
economically productive 66 and socially beneficial associations which
can operate only if some restrictions-which arguably could
constitute a concerted refusal to deal-are placed on access. One
example, the stock exchange, has been discussed previously. 6 7 There
a congressional mandate exists for self-regulation through use of the
exchange's exclusionary power. Another example is the news
gathering operations of wire services such as the Associated Press.
In order for a wire service to attract members and operate
162. Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847,
872 (1955).
163. For example, if a group of toy stores agreed not to buy or sell airplane glue because
of its hallucinogenic use by young people, the manufacturers of airplane glue would certainly
be affected.
164. See Barber,supra note 162, at 877.
165. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 73, at 305.
166. These have been found where a group takes action in concert "in order to overcome
the impracticability of any one member's amassing sufficient capital for the project or in order
to eliminate the economic waste involved in duplication of effort." Note, Concerted Refusals
to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 1531, 1536 (1958).
167. See notes 116-19, 150 supra and accompanying text.
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effectively, members must agree to sell local news only to the service,
and the wire service must be able to expel members for violating this
agreement.'68 Those nonmembers who try to buy local news from a
member will see the agreement as a concerted refusal to deal. If a
court following a per se rule agreed, the benefits that AP provides
by avoiding the need for costly duplication of news gathering
systems would be lost. Another example would be professional
sports leagues, where the necessary effect of having a schedule is a
boycott of nonleague teams.'69
The common characteristic of situations where the marginal gain
in public policy purpose achievable only through collective economic
power is likely to outweigh attendant harms is the industry's need
for self-regulation through collective action.7 0 Where the need for
self-regulation has been statutorily recognized and a scheme of
federal regulation established which clearly contemplates selfregulation, 7' application of the per se rule would frustrate this
scheme. Boycotts should not be exempted from the per se rule,
however, merely because their purpose is to further a statutory
policy. Rather, it must be clear that the policy of the statute
contemplates the exercise of boycotting power to further the
statutory purpose. It has been suggested that an equally valid
authorization for industry self-regulation might be found in
nonstatutory sources, such as declarations by courts, administrative
bodies, or even "authoritative policy statements by governmental
officials."' 7 2 To avoid having to decide whether a public official's
toasting the joys of self-regulation at a trade association banquet is
sufficiently "authoritative," the sounder rule would be that in the
168. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), held that restrictions on access

to membership in AP could not be stricter for competitors of existing members than for
noncompetitors. The Court declined to hold that prohibitions on members selling news to

anyone not a member of the Association were illegal. Id. at 21-22.
169. See 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 102, at 419-20; notes 102-05 supra and

accompanying text.
170. It may seem that the AP's purpose in prohibiting members' selling of local news to

nonmembers is purely commercial, intended only to reduce members' costs of newsgathering
and thus increase their profits. A distinction should be drawn between a group's intention to
increase profits primarily by harming others (no social gain), and an intention to increase
profits by lowering the costs to society and to themselves of carrying on their business
activities (a net gain). The latter is enough of a noncommercial purpose to warrant discussion
at this point in the analysis.
171. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
172. Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices:An Affirmative Role for the Rule of
Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1486, 1500 (1966).
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absence of statutory recognition of a need for self-regulation, the
declarations of other branches of government, state or federal,
should be considered as no more than evidence of an industry's need
for self-regulation, to be given as much weight as their reasoning
compels and no more.
The need for industry self-regulation might be found not only in
the express mandate of Congress, but in the structural requirements
of the industry itself. 73 The successful operation of the joint facility
virtually compels some exercise of exclusionary power for such
collective ventures as stock exchanges, wire services, and professional
sports leagues. A similar exception to the rule of per se illegality
should be made for collective refusals to deal essential for selfregulation, where the industry structure itself requires self74
regulation.
But what would be the limits on the exception to the per se rule
for industries where the need for self-regulation is recognized by
statute or inherent in the structure of the industry itself?. One
limitation would be a requirement that the exercise of exclusionary
power be germane to the need for self-regulation. Thus, if the
National Basketball Association were to bar a player from
competition because he was an atheist, or had refused to submit to
induction into the army, a court could properly avoid applying the
rule of reason and hold such exclusionary practice illegal per se. A
similar result would follow if the Associated Press were to expel a
member for violating agreed-upon standards as to what constitutes
prejudicial pretrial publicity for criminal defendants. A second
limitation would be that the exercise of exclusionary power must be
the minimum necessary to achieve the regulatory goal.
A third limitation necessary to deal with the twin dangers of
173. Id. at 1499-1502.
174. As conditions in the industry change, it is quite possible that a limitation on access
to a joint facility which was once required for the successful operation of the facility may no
longer be necessary. For example, the absolute limitation on the number of seats on the New
York Stock Exchange, N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1817), may well have been necessary
in the pre-electronic days when the exchange was composed of floor traders transacting
business with each other within the confines of a single room. The limitation must be
considered suspect, however, now that modern communication systems have eliminated the
necessity that all traders in the market be physically present in the same room. See
Memorandum of the United States Department of Justice on the Fixed Minimum
Commission Rate Structure, In re Commission Rate Structure of Registered National
Securities Exchanges, Securities and Exchange Commission No. 4-144, at 149-52, Jan. 17,
1969.
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arbitrariness and anticompetitive motives masquerading as
regulatory motives in group action was suggested in Silver.7 In view
of such dangers, the Court there held that the Exchange could not
even reach the "threshold of justification"'' for its action without
affording to the excluded person notice of the proposed action and
an opportunity to be heard. Requiring notice and a hearing of some
sort would provide a record from which the antitrust court could
determine (1)whether the particular exercise of exclusionary power
is germane to and justified by the need for self-regulation found in
statute or industry structure, and (2) whether less harmful means
could have been used to achieve the valid regulatory goal. Such a
requirement would also provide a partial answer to the troubling
problems of private power. If it is not in the public interest to break
up these particular aggregations of private economic power, at the
very least the requirements of procedural due process should be
77
imposed on their exercise.'
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the most appropriate judicial response to the
problems raised by noncommercial boycotts is a rule of per se
illegality, with an exception. The exception would be for group
exclusionary activities in an industry in which the need for selfregulation is established by statute or required for the successful
operation of the joint facilities which comprise the industry. In order
to be judged under a rule of reason, the exercise of exclusionary
power must meet at least these conditions: First, it must be preceded
by notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the person excluded.
Second, it must be germane to the recognized need for selfregulation. Finally, it must be no more harmful than necessary to
achieve the group's valid self-regulatory goals. Application of the
above approach would maximize the benefits of a per se rule in an
area where the costs incurred by the rule's summary treatment
would be least, and would preserve a role for the rule of reason in
those cases where the benefits to be achieved are likely to be worth
the time and effort that such an inquiry entails.
175. See notes 116-19, 150 supra and accompanying text.

176. 373 U.S. at 365.
177. The problem of what combination of criminal penalties, treble damage actions, and

injunctive relief provides the most appropriate remedy for illegal noncommercial concerted
refusals to deal is beyond the scope of this paper. The difficulties in fashioning a suitable
remedy once a violation is discovered are not particularly relevant in deciding whether a rule
of reason or a perse approach would be preferable.

